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I.

INTRODUCTION

HE expression that "everything is bigger in Texas" certainly holds
true when it comes to insurance litigation. During the mid- to late1980s, the judicial pendulum in Texas appeared to favor insureds,
resulting in both a large quantity of claims and large recoveries for plaintiffs. In fact, the perceived "pro-insured" tilt of the judicial pendulum
nearly caused an insurance crisis in Texas as insurance companies contemplated their future existence in the Lone Star State. During this time,
* I would like to thank Professor Ellen S. Pryor for sparking my interest in insurance
law and for her infinite patience in answering all of my questions.
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perhaps nothing struck more fear in the hearts of insurance companies
than the threat of "bad faith" claims.1
In 1987, the Texas Supreme Court first recognized the existence of the
independent tort of "bad faith" in the first-party context.2 Since then, the
Texas courts have grappled with a host of issues that continue to plague
the insurance law practitioner while providing plenty of legal and social
issues for academic debate. While it is undisputed that under Texas law
an insurer owes its policyholder a duty of good faith and fair dealing, the
Texas courts have had difficulty articulating a clear standard for determining what actions or omissions by an insurer constitute bad faith conduct. Equally challenging has been the Texas courts' struggle to
articulate and apply the proper scope of appellate review for bad faith
cases.
A prominent issue within the debate over the proper scope of the firstparty tort of bad faith has been whether or not to recognize a cause of
action in the absence of coverage. In 1995, the Texas Supreme Court
reversed an appellate decision permitting such a cause of action and held
that, in general, there can be no bad faith claim in the absence of coverage. 3 While purporting to announce a general rule, however, the court
stated, "We do not exclude ... the possibility that in denying the claim,
the insurer may commit some act, so extreme, that would cause injury
independent of the policy claim."'4 The court did not, however, advise the
practitioner as to what types of acts or omissions are extreme enough to
overcome the general proscription against liability in the absence of
coverage.
Not only has defining the elements of a bad faith cause of action created confusion, an issue has arisen among scholars and courts as to
whether tort law, contract law, or statutory law provides the best foundation for remedying bad faith liability. As will be illustrated, this debate is
being answered by plaintiffs who are increasingly avoiding the heightened
1. In Texas, the term "bad faith" is synonymous with a breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing. For the purposes of this Comment, "bad faith" and "breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing" will be used interchangeably.
2. Arnold v. National County Mut. Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987). The term
first-party refers to insurance policies in which the insured contracts with the insurer to
indemnify the insured against a loss suffered directly by the insured. Third-party insurance, on the other hand, is designed to protect the insured against claims made by a thirdparty against the insured. All forms of insurance other than liability insurance can be considered first-party insurance. ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 3839 (2d ed. 1996). At the time Arnold was decided, Texas had already long recognized that
an insurer has a duty to exercise ordinary care in the handling of settlement negotiations.
G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1929, holding approved). This duty, known as the Stowers duty, is limited to the handling
of third-party claims. Arnold, on the other hand, recognized the duty of good faith and fair
dealing in the handling of first-party claims. As will be illustrated, the standard for proving
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is more onerous than proving breach of
the Stowers duty. Because Texas law differs with respect to first-party and third-party insurance, this Comment will focus exclusively on first-party insurance.
3. Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1995).
4. Id. at 341.
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burden of proving common law bad faith actions and are instead seeking
statutory recoveries under the Texas Insurance Code.
This Comment focuses on the recent shift of the judicial pendulum
away from the perceived "pro-insured" tilt of the mid- and late-1980s and
the resulting emergence and predominance of the Texas Insurance Code
in bad faith litigation. Part II of this Comment provides a brief historical
overview of the evolution of first-party bad faith and its ultimate adoption by the Texas Supreme Court. Part III discusses the different formulations articulated by the Texas Supreme Court for determining when an
insured has breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. This section
includes a discussion on the increasing willingness of Texas courts to use
summary judgment and directed verdicts to resolve common-law bad
faith claims as a matter of law. Furthermore, this section analyzes the
Texas Supreme Court's "particularized" approach to appellate review in
bad faith cases. Part IV explores the concept of allowing bad faith liability in the absence of coverage. Finally, Part V will examine whether tort
law, contract law, or statutory law is the best source for providing a remedy to aggrieved insureds. This examination will center on the policy
concerns surrounding the availability of extracontractual damages.
This Comment strives to provide an objective focus on all of the abovementioned issues. Accordingly, it should be read as an exploration of the
recent shift in Texas law as opposed to an endorsement or condemnation
of either the plaintiff's bar or the insurance industry.
Additionally, although this Comment concentrates on Texas law, the
issues and concerns raised are certainly not unique to Texas. It is hoped,
therefore, that this Comment will benefit legal practitioners throughout
the country.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

TORT STANDARD FOR FIRST-PARTY BAD FAITH

To better understand the current status of first-party bad faith law in
Texas, it is helpful to briefly examine the evolution of bad faith from its
contract origins to its current existence, in most jurisdictions, as an independent tort.
In the early 1970s, the courts of California led the way in developing a
tort standard for the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.5 In
Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.,6 a California appellate
court held that an insurer was liable both for breach of contract and in
tort for damages caused by its unreasonable refusal to indemnify its insured under a disability policy. 7 In 1973, the California Supreme Court,
in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co.,8 squarely addressed the issue of
5. Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litigation,
25 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 107 (1994).

6. 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1970).

7. Id. at 93.
8. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
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whether a tort remedy was available for a breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing. The Gruenberg court agreed with the reasoning of
Fletcher and affirmatively recognized bad faith as an independent tort:
It is manifest that a common legal principle underlies all of the
foregoing decisions; namely, that in every insurance contract there is
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The duty to so
act is imminent in the contract whether the company is attending to
the claims of third persons against the insured or the claims of the
insured itself. Accordingly, when the insurer unreasonably and in
bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its insured, it is subject
to liability in tort.9
Although it is difficult to determine which states have formally adopted
the independent tort of first-party bad faith, a0 it is clear that a majority of
states do recognize some form of independent tort recovery for bad faith
conduct."
A survey of the states also illustrates that a fair number of jurisdictions
have explicitly refused to recognize a common-law action for bad faith.
The most recognized and widely used rationale for refusing to do so is the
existence of state legislation that provides exclusive remedies for legislatively defined bad faith conduct on the part of the insurer.' 2 Another
common reason advanced by jurisdictions that reject a common-law
cause of action for bad faith is that the important policy concerns for
allowing bad faith recovery in third-party claims do not exist in the firstparty context.1 3 Finally, it is clear that an underlying rationale for refusing to adopt the tort of first-party bad faith is fear of a tidal wave of tort
litigation and its resulting negative consequences.

B.

TEXAS COURTS ADOPT TORT STANDARD

The Texas courts were slow to recognize a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in the first-party insurance context. In the 1983 case of English v.
9. Id. at 1038.
10. Randy Papetti, Note, The Insurer's Duty of Good Faith in the Context of Litigation,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1931, 1941 n.53 (1992).
11. Id.; see also Douglas R. Richmond, Truly "Extracontractual"Liability: Insurer Bad
Faith in the Absence of Coverage, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 740, 743 n.22 (1994).
12. See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 158 (Kan. 1980)
("The legislature has provided several remedies for an aggrieved insured and has dealt
with the question of good faith first party claims ....

Where the legislature has provided

such detailed and effective remedies, we find it undesirable for us to expand those remedies by judicial decree."); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 581
(N.H. 1978) ("[W]e take cognizance of the fact that the legislature has established mechanisms designed to deal with insurer malfeasance in [the insurance] area, which, in our opinion, vitiates the need for recognition of a new cause of action in tort."); D'Ambrosio v.
Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966, 970 (Pa. 1981) ("[Tjhe Unfair
Insurance Practices Act serves adequately to deter bad faith conduct .... ").
13. Lawton, 392 A.2d at 580-81 (reasoning that an insurer in the first-party context "is
not in a position to expose the insured to a judgment in excess of the policy limits through
its unreasonable refusal to settle a case, nor is it in a position to otherwise injure the insured by virtue of its exclusive control over the defense of the case"); see also Spencer, 611
P.2d at 153.
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Fischer,14 the Texas Supreme Court, like the Gruenberg court, recognized that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may arise
out of a "special relationship" between parties to a contract. 15 The court
declined, however, to extend the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to every contract, including insurance contracts. 16 The English
17
decision, therefore, restricted an insured to a suit for breach of contract.
Accordingly, an insured was entitled only to contractual damages which
were, by nature, limited to the benefits due under the policy.
In 1987, fourteen years after the Gruenberg decision, the Texas
Supreme Court, in Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance
Co.,' 8 squarely addressed the issue of whether a first-party claimant can
bring a tort action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Arnold involved a motorcyclist who was severely injured when he was
struck by an uninsured motorist. After the accident, Arnold made a
timely request to recover policy proceeds from his uninsured motorist
carrier. The insurer, National County Mutual (NCM), refused to pay the
claim and in doing so, ignored the recommendations of an independent
adjusting firm that NCM pay the entire policy limit to Arnold.' 9 After
successfully suing both the uninsured motorist and NCM for breach of
contract, Arnold initiated another suit against NCM alleging various statutory causes of action and a common-law cause of action for NCM's
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
The trial court granted summary judgment to NCM on all of the statutory and common-law causes of action and the court of appeals affirmed.
The Texas Supreme Court granted writ in the case to determine whether
a common-law cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing exists in the insurance context.
The Texas Supreme Court affirmatively recognized that the insurance
context is marked by a special relationship arising out of unequal bargaining power between the insurers and their insureds. 20 Additionally, the
court noted that the insurance company has complete and exclusive control over the evaluation, processing, and denial of claims. 2' It is precisely
this unfair bargaining power, the court stated, that could "allow unscrupulous insurers to take advantage of their insureds' misfortunes in bar14. 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983). The case involved a homeowner who sued his mortgagee for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing for failing to turn over fire insurance proceeds following a fire.
15. Id. at 524 (Spears, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 522.
17. Evelyn T. Ailts, Comment, A New Tort for Texas: Breach of the Duty of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1295, 1312 (1987).
18. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
19. The evidence demonstrated that NCM followed the advice of their attorney/agent
in denying the claim. During deposition testimony, the attorney/agent acknowledged his
inexperience in handling automobile accidents and further testified that his decision was
based on his belief that a jury would be prejudiced against a motorcyclist, especially since
Arnold was driving too fast under the existing conditions. Id. at 166.
20. Id. at 167.
21. Id.
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gaining for settlement or resolution of claims." '22
In recognizing that a special relationship exists in the first-party insurance context, the court was no longer constrained by the English precedent. Thus, the tort of first-party bad faith was expressly adopted in
Texas. Notwithstanding this recognition, defining the parameters of the
tort proved to be a difficult task for Texas courts.
III.

STATING A CLAIM OF BAD FAITH

Although the Arnold decision established the uncontroverted fact that
insurers owe their insureds a duty of good faith and fair dealing, the decision, apart from setting out a two-pronged test, did little to define the
parameters of the newly adopted tort. Furthermore, because claims of
bad faith exist in nearly every modern insurance coverage dispute, 23 this

lack of clarity led to some confusion on the part of both the plaintiff's bar
and the insurance industry.

A.

THE ARNOLD TEST

In Arnold, the Texas Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test for
determining when a cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing has been stated:
A cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is stated when it is alleged that there is no reasonable basis for
denial of a claim or delay in payment or a failure on the part of the
insurer to determine whether there is any reasonable basis for the
24
denial or delay.
The use of a two-pronged test for stating a claim of bad faith is fairly
common among jurisdictions recognizing the duty of good faith and fair
dealing in the first-party context. 25 Although the test varies slightly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction,2 6 the majority of jurisdictions has a test that
requires that an insured must prove "(1) that the [insurer's] conduct was
unreasonable and (2) that the insurer intentionally denied a claim or
delayed payment of a claim that the [insurer] knew to be valid or showed
'2 7
a reckless disregard of the fact that a valid claim had been submitted.
22. Id.
23. David J. Schubert, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing-Recent Developments, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, 8TH ANN. ADVANCED DTPA/INSURANCE/CONSUMER

LAW COURSE N-1 (May 1995).

24. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167 (emphasis added).
25. Schubert, supra note 23, at N-I; see also Ellen S. Pryor, Comparative Fault and
InsuranceBad Faith, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1505, 1535 n.86 (1994).

26. The main variation among jurisdictions centers around whether a culpable mental
state higher than mere negligence is required to state a claim of bad faith. Papetti, supra
note 10, at 1939. Although a minority of jurisdictions permit negligence to serve as a basis
for recovery, the great majority of jurisdictions require the plaintiff to prove more than just
mere negligence.

DENNIS J. WALL, LITIGATION AND PREVENTION OF INSURER BAD FAITH

§ 9.09, at 402 (1994).
27. Schubert, supra note 23, at N-1.
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As one can see, the second prong of the Arnold test differs from that of
the traditional test. Specifically, the Arnold test does not require intent
or reckless disregard. Furthermore, because Arnold speaks only in terms
of reasonableness, one could infer that the court intended negligence to
suffice as the standard for stating a claim of bad faith. Certainly, if the
court meant to exclude mere negligence as the standard for recovery,
they could have easily added a subjective requirement. 28 An additional
difference between the Arnold test and the traditional test is that under
the second prong of the Arnold formulation, failure to investigate, in and
29
of itself, can serve as an independent basis for bad faith recovery.
B.

THE ARANDA DECISION

One year after the decision in Arnold, the Texas Supreme Court, in
Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America,30 was given an opportunity to
extend the Arnold holding into the worker's compensation arena.
Aranda involved an injured worker who, at the time he became unable to
work, was employed by two different companies. Aranda filed a claim
against both companies and alleged that his injuries were the result of his
work at either or both of the companies. Both carriers subsequently refused to pay weekly disability payments until the Industrial Accident
Board ruled on the matter. Aranda claimed intentional misconduct and
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing on the part of both
carriers.
The Texas Supreme Court held that "[t]he contract between a compensation carrier and an employee creates the same type of special relationship that arises under other insurance contracts. '31 In extending bad
faith liability into the worker's compensation arena, the court also, arguably, changed the Arnold test:
A worker's compensation claimant who asserts that a carrier has
breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing by refusing to pay or
delaying payment of a claim must establish (1) the absence of a reasonable basis for denying or delaying payment of the benefits of the
policy and (2) that the carrier knew or should have known that there
was not a reasonable
basis for denying the claim or delaying payment
of the claim. 32
28. See, e.g., Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 378 (Wis. 1978) (recognizing that bad faith is an intentional tort in which knowledge or reckless disregard must
be demonstrated). The Arnold court, on the other hand, cited to the negligence standard
as set forth in G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved), for the proposition that an insurer should be held
to the degree of care that an ordinary and reasonable insurer would exercise in the management of a claim. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167.
29. Stephen S. Ashley, The Scope of Appellate Review in Texas Bad Faith Cases, 10
BAD FAITH L. REP. 1, 4 (1994). This conclusion follows from the court's use of "or" to
separate the two prongs of the Arnold test.
30. 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988).
31. Id. at 212.
32. Id. at 213 (emphasis added).
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The first prong of the Aranda test is "an objective determination of
whether a reasonable insurer under similar circumstances would have
delayed or denied the claimant's benefits. '33 As in Arnold, the court's
use of "reasonableness" leads to the inference that the court intended for
34
negligence to be the standard basis for recovery.
The second prong of the Aranda formulation differs significantly from
Arnold in that it adds a subjective element, which was missing from Arnold. To satisfy the second prong of the Aranda test, an insured must
either demonstrate that "the carrier actually knew there was no reasonable basis to deny the claim or delay payment or [establish] that the carrier, based on its duty to investigate, should have known that there was
no reasonable basis for denial or delay. '35 This addition, according to the
Aranda court, "balances the right of an insurer to reject an invalid claim
36
and the duty of the carrier to investigate and pay compensable claims."
Ultimately, the effect of this addition is that insurers are shielded from
liability for making erroneous denials as long as some reasonable basis
existed at the time. Additionally, a literal reading of Aranda illustrates
that, unlike in Arnold, a failure to investigate, in and of itself, is not suffi37
cient to state a claim of bad faith.
A further difference between Arnold and Aranda is that only Aranda is
truly a two-pronged test. Specifically, the second prong of the Aranda
test is connected to the first by the conjunctive "and" instead of the disjunctive "or" as in Arnold. This is not merely a grammatical difference
without consequence.3 8 In Arnold, an insured can state a claim of bad
faith by alleging that the insurer failed to meet either the first prong of
the test or the second. Under Aranda, it is clear that the insured must
prove both prongs of the test in order to prevail.
Implicitly, both the Arnold and Aranda formulations contain a third
element-causation. In order to recover damages for breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing, the insured must prove that the insurer's
lack of good faith proximately caused damages to the insured. 39 This is
significant when it comes to recovery for mental anguish or emotional
distress. Accordingly, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that it was the insurer's conduct and not the underlying incident
that proximately caused the extracontractual damages.
33. Id.
34. It is clear, however, that application of the Aranda test requires the plaintiff to
make a showing above mere negligence. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Garza, 906
S.W.2d 543, 549-50 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ).
35. Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 213.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. As one appellate court has recently noted, "This simple change in phraseology
from 'or' to 'and' set the stage for an effective dismantling of the bad faith cause of action."
Columbia Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Miles, 923 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996,
writ requested).
39. See Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 215.
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What makes the Aranda decision confusing for Texas practitioners is
the fact that the Texas Supreme Court never explained how the Aranda
holding was supposed to effect the Arnold precedent. 40 Specifically, the
Aranda court never stated whether the new test for stating a claim of bad
faith was supposed to replace, modify, or co-exist with Arnold.4 1 As illustrated above, the two formulations are clearly different and, thus, can
produce varying results depending upon which test a court chooses to

apply.42

C.

CHOOSING BETWEEN ARNOLD

& ARANDA

The confusion over the Arnold/Aranda dichotomy was illustrated in the
case of Automobile Insurance Co. v. Davila,43 a case involving a wrongful
denial of insurance benefits following a fire loss. In Davila, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant insurer wrongfully denied insurance benefits
following a fire loss. Specifically, the alleged bad faith conduct was the
insurer's failure to investigate beyond Mrs. Davila's initial accusation that
her husband set the fire. The defendant insurer "seized on the substance
of the accusations and failed to look beyond them into the circumstances
of the situation and recognize that the accusations could have been retaliatory or made in anger." 44 The defendant insurer, Aetna, tendered a requested instruction that tracked the test as set forth in Aranda.4 5 The
trial court, however, submitted an instruction that tracked the language in
Arnold.46 As noted by the court, an essential difference between an instruction tracking Aranda as opposed to one tracking Arnold is the addi40. The Aranda court ignored the one-year-old Arnold holding when announcing the
new standard for first-party bad faith claims. Instead, the court relied on two cases from
other states: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1272 (Colo. 1985); Anderson v.
Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978). Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 213.
41. Ashley, supra note 29, at 5.
42. See discussion infra part III.C.
43. 805 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied) (disapproved on
other grounds).
44. Id. at 906 (emphasis added).
45. Aetna tendered the following instruction:
You are instructed that there is a duty on the part of an insurance company
to deal fairly and in good faith with those persons whom it insures. You are
further instructed that, in order for the conduct of an insurance company in
denying or delaying payment of a claim to constitute a failure to exercise
good faith, it must be shown that the insurer denied or delayed payment of
the claim at a time when it knew it had no reasonable basis for denying the
claim or delaying the payment of the claim or the insurer failed to determine
whether there was any reasonable basis for delay.
Id. at 903-04.
46. The trial court submitted the following instruction:
There is a duty on the part of an insurance company to deal fairly and in
good faith with those persons whom it insures. You are further instructed
that, in order for the conduct of an insurance company in denying or delaying
payment of a claim to constitute a failure to exercise good faith, it must be
shown that the insurer had no reasonable basis for denying the claim or delaying payment or the insurer failed to determine whether there was any reasonable basis for the delay.
Id. at 903.
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tional subjective element contained in the Aranda test. Aetna claimed
that by not including the subjective element, it was deprived of a fair trial.
Although the appellate court expressly recognized that Arnold and
Aranda set forth different standards for stating a claim of bad faith, it
noted that both tests constitute correct statements of Texas law. 47 The
court did state, however, that the Aranda test "more specifically defines
the elements of the cause of action for breach of good faith and fair dealing. '' 48 Nevertheless, the court held that issuing an instruction that tracks
Arnold does not constitute reversible error. 49
The Davila decision illustrates that a bad faith case can be won or lost
by the instruction given to the jury. Clearly, the Arnold instruction was
more beneficial to the Davilas in that failure to investigate, by itself,
would have been actionable bad faith conduct. On the other hand, the
Aranda formulation would have favored the defendant insurer because
the failure to investigate, by itself, would not have been sufficient to state
a claim for bad faith. Furthermore, application of the Aranda test increases the burden on the plaintiff by requiring a showing, by a preponderance of evidence, that the insurer had subjective knowledge that it was
50
acting unreasonably.
Another case which demonstrates the confusion over which test to apply is In re Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Insurance Coverage Litigation.5 1 This case is interesting because it involved a
federal district court judge sitting in Pennsylvania trying to predict how
the Texas Supreme Court would resolve the differences between Arnold
and Aranda. The plaintiff contended that Arnold set forth the exclusive
test for stating a claim of bad faith in Texas. The court disagreed by noting that Texas courts have consistently applied both the Arnold and
Aranda formulations. 52 The court did, however, cite Davila to support
the proposition that Aranda more specifically sets out the elements of the
bad faith cause of action. 53 Accordingly, the court dismissed the bad faith
47. Id. at 904.
48. Id.
49. Id. But see Southland Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Tomberlain, 919 S.W.2d 822, 829-30 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied) (holding that use of "or" rather than "and" in jury
instruction constituted reversible error). The current version of the Texas Pattern Jury
Charges contains alternative instructions, one that tracks Arnold and one that tracks
Aranda. 4 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, PATrERN JURY CHARGES PJC 103.02A, 103.02B (1993).
The committee designated to draft the Texas PatternJury Charges is currently revising PJC
103.02. Based on decisions such as Tomberlain, it is doubtful that future revisions of PJC
103.02 will allow for alternative submissions.
50. This is a difficult burden to meet. Accordingly, a large number of bad faith cases
tried under the Aranda test never reach a jury. See discussion infra part III.E.
51. No. MDL 764, 1992 WL 167984 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 1992). Texas Eastern sued 21
insurance companies under a CGL policy to try to recover future expenses for a governmentally mandated environmental cleanup. The case was originally brought in Texas, but
was transferred by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to Pennsylvania for consolidation for pretrial purposes. Despite the transfer of venue, Texas law applied to all of the
relevant issues.
52. Id. at *3.
53. Id.
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claim, noting that an insurer's alleged failure to investigate, by itself, cannot support a bad faith judgment and that the plaintiff never alleged that
the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for denying or delaying payment of
the claim. 54 Of significance under Aranda, according to the court, is the
insurer's right to deny debatable or questionable claims without fear of
being subjected to bad faith liability. 55 The court further noted that
"[a]llowing an insured to state a cause of action without alleging that no
reasonable basis for denial or
delay existed would effectively deny the
'56
insurer this important right."
D.

SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT LAW

Although the Davila holding appears to be a bright light for insureds,
an examination of recent cases illustrates that Davila is nothing more
than a flickering candle in the wake of hurricane force winds. 57 Assuming that the Aranda test is the test used for stating a claim of bad faith in
Texas, a plaintiff has the difficult burden of proving a negative proposition-that the carrier knew
or should have known it had no reasonable
58
basis for denying a claim.
Furthermore, as stated earlier, although the Aranda test sounds in negligence, the application of the test requires the plaintiff to prove conduct
that goes beyond traditional notions of negligence.5 9 For example, under
the Aranda test, an insurance adjuster can, without being subjected to
bad faith liability, deny a claim where ten percent of the evidence points
to noncoverage and the other ninety percent points to coverage. 60 As
one can see, a plaintiff has a difficult obstacle to overcome in proving that
the insurer acted in bad faith. Accordingly, Texas courts have become
54. Id.
55. Id. at *4.
56. Id.
57. Although the Texas Supreme Court relied on the duty to investigate in Viles v.
Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 788 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1990), it certainly appears clear that the "Arnold standard has since been subsumed by Aranda and is of dubious validity standing
alone." Columbia Universal, 923 S.W.2d at 807 n.3. In fact, none of the major reported
cases over the last two years have applied the Arnold test by itself for stating a claim of bad
faith. See, e.g., Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1995); Transportation Ins.
Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tex. 1994); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dominguez,
873 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1994); Lyons v. Millers Casualty Ins. Co., 866 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1993).
However, in footnote two of the Lyons opinion, Justice Cornyn stated: "This case was
tried under the Aranda formulation of the bad faith test, and we therefore restrict our
analysis accordingly." Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 600 n.2. A liberal reading of this statement
could lead to the conclusion that the Texas Supreme Court was granting trial courts the
leeway to tender instructions that track either the Arnold or Aranda test. See Ashley,
supra note 29, at 5.
58. Dominguez, 873 S.W.2d at 376.
59. Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312, 318-19 (Tex. 1994) (Cornyn, J.,
concurring).
60. Although it is certainly true that an insurer's reason for denial cannot be merely
pretext, Michael S. Quinn & L. Kimberly Steele, Insurance Coverage Opinions, 36 S.TEx.
L. REv. 479, 493 (1995), the fact that the Texas Supreme Court has broadly construed what

constitutes "reasonable" conduct leads to the conclusion that this example would hold true
even if the ratio was 99% to 1% as long as the insurer reasonably relied on that 1% of
evidence in denying the claim.
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increasingly more willing to dispose of bad faith claims as a matter of law
61
by summary judgment and directed verdict.
E.

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

In Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel,62 the court noted that
"[e]vidence that merely shows a bona fide dispute about the insurer's liability on the contract does not rise to the level of bad faith."'6 3 Similarly,
the court noted that "bad faith [is not] established if the evidence shows
the insurer was merely incorrect about the factual basis for its denial of
the claim . . . ."64 These findings demonstrate why plaintiffs are increasingly falling victim to judgments as a matter of law. 65
When determining whether a material fact issue exists in a bad faith
case, all evidence favorable to the nonmovant (i.e., the insured) is considered true, and all reasonable inferences are decided in the nonmovant's
favor.6 6 While this standard sounds favorable for insureds, the reality is
that an insurer, in order to prevail, must only prove the existence of a
bona fide dispute:
Since the proponent of a bad faith claim has the burden of proving
that there existed no reasonable basis for the insurer's action, the
insurer may satisfy its summary judgment burden by establishing the
existence of a reasonable basis for denial or delay, thus negating an
67
essential element of plaintiff's claim.
Furthermore, as stated earlier, the courts have taken a broad view of
what constitutes a "bona fide" dispute. For example, in Packer v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,68 the court held that even the fact that the claims adjuster subjectively desired to deny the claim was not sufficient to
overcome a motion for summary judgment as long as some reasonable
reason for the denial existed. 69 Accordingly, the court affirmed the summary judgment even though the plaintiff presented uncontroverted written proof that the adjuster purposefully tried to take advantage of the
70
fact that the claimant was not yet represented by counsel.
The court in Packer cited Lyons v. Millers Casualty Insurance Co. 71 for
61. Schubert, supra note 23, at N-1.
62. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
63. Id. at 17 (citing Dominguez, 873 S.W.2d at 376-77).
64. Id. at 18 (citing Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 601).
65. The use of summary judgment has increased dramatically in those jurisdictions
that have a subjective prong. William T. Barker & Paul E. B. Glad, Use of Summary
Judgment in Defense of Bad Faith Actions Involving First-PartyInsurance, 30 TORT & INS.
L.J. 49, 52 (1994). According to Barker and Glad, "[Summary judgments] avoid the risk of
jury sympathy for a financially distressed plaintiff seeking recovery from a wealthy and
impersonal insurance company. Most importantly, summary judgments avoid expensive
and unnecessary trials on bad faith." Id. at 49-50.
66. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).
67. Connolly v. Service Lloyds Ins. Co., 910 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1995, no writ).
68. 881 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).
69. Id. at 177.
70. Id.
71.

866 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1993).
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the proposition that the focus of a bad faith claim is not on the contract
issue of coverage, but rather on the reasonableness of the insurer's conduct. 72 Although Lyons is the seminal case discussing the proper scope of
appellate review in bad faith cases, the Packer court noted that "its analysis is properly applied in a summary judgment case because the quantum
'73
of evidence necessary to raise a fact issue is the same in both contexts.
As one can see, the plaintiff has a significant burden to overcome
before passing the summary judgment stage of a bad faith cause of action.
Even if the plaintiff survives a summary judgment or directed verdict and
obtains a favorable jury verdict, the plaintiff must still face the daunting
forces of appellate review.

F. A

"PARTICULARIZED" APPROACH TO APPELLATE REVIEW

The scope of appellate review for bad faith cases has been a constant
source of confusion for Texas courts. The confusion has centered around
how to apply the traditional "no evidence" or "legal sufficiency" test to a
negative proposition-that the insurer had no reasonable basis to deny or
74
delay payment of a claim.
The traditional application of a legal sufficiency review of a "no evidence" point of error permits the appellate court to "consider only the
evidence and inferences tending to support the finding and disregard all
evidence and inferences to the contrary. '75 This approach was followed
by the Beaumont Court of Appeals in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Simmons,76 a first-party bad faith case involving a fire loss under a homeowner's policy. In affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the appellate
court noted that it cannot second guess the factfinder and, therefore,
must affirm the decision of the trial court if there is some evidence of
77
unreasonableness.
A very different view was taken by the San Antonio Court of Appeals
in State Farm Lloyds v. Polasek,78 yet another fire loss claim. In reversing
the bad faith portion of the case, the court noted that those courts who
affirm trial court judgments on the basis that "some" evidence supports
the jury verdict "have not correctly interpreted the nature of the bad faith
cause of action set forth in Arnold and Aranda, in which the insured must
negate the existence of a reasonable basis for denying or delaying payment."' 79 The correct standard, according to the Polasek court, requires
that a plaintiff "prove that there were no facts before the insurer which, if
72. Packer, 881 S.W.2d at 174 (citing Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 601).
73. Id.

74. Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 600.
75. Aim v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tex. 1986) (citing Garza v.
Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965)).
76. 857 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied).
77. Id. at 132.

78. 847 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
79. Id. at 286.
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believed, would justify denial of the claim." 80 Furthermore, the court reaffirmed the proposition that the seminal issue in a bad faith action "is
whether there was evidence in existence before [the insurer] . .. not
whether [the insurer] correctly evaluated the evidence before it."8' 1 Essentially, the court's holding stands for the proposition that a bad faith
judgment cannot be affirmed upon a showing that "some" evidence supports the jury's verdict since the total absence of any reasonable basis
implicitly requires that there be no evidence before the insurer that, if
82
believed, would support denial of recovery.
In an attempt to clarify the standard, the Texas Supreme Court granted
writ in Lyons, 83 and the court's subsequent decision has been called "the
most significant decision penned by the Texas Supreme Court concerning
the duty of good faith and fair dealing since Arnold and Aranda.'' 84 The
case involved a bad faith suit arising out of an insurer's refusal to pay a
homeowner's claim made after a windstorm damaged her home. Following the denial of the claim, the insured initiated a lawsuit alleging breach
of contract, violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(DTPA), violation of the Texas Insurance Code, and breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing.
In addition to finding that the insurer violated the DTPA, the jury also
found that the insurer had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial judge rendered judgment on the verdict in the amount of
$89,950. The court of appeals, however, reversed and held that there was
no evidence of a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing or a
violation of the DTPA. The case presented the Texas Supreme Court
with the opportunity to articulate the proper scope of appellate review in
bad faith cases.
The Texas Supreme Court held that "when a court is reviewing the
legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a bad faith finding, its focus
should be on the relationship of the evidence arguably supporting the bad
faith finding to the elements of bad faith."' 85 Essentially, the court rejected the reasoning of the Simmons court that it should only look to the
evidence supporting the judgment. 86 Instead, the court held that an ap80. Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
81. Id.at 285.
82. Id. The court further noted that "[wihere there is undisputed evidence that a reasonable basis existed for denying an insurance claim, the bad faith cause of action is defeated as a matter of law." Id. at 284 (emphasis in original). In Simmons, the court harshly
referred to the Polasek opinion as being "the beginning of the end of a common law cause
of action against insurers for bad faith" and that the holding effectively "whittle[s] away yet
another avenue of recourse for the people." Simmons, 857 S.W.2d at 142.
83. 866 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1993).
84. Philip K. Maxwell & Tim Labadie, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
48 SMU L. REV. 1351, 1352 (1995).
85. Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 600.
86. Interestingly, the Beaumont Court of Appeals, which wrote the Simmons opinion,
recently narrowed the holding: "We view Simmons as narrowly restrictive to those cases
where an insurer wholly disregards its obligation to its insured in pursuit of the insurer's

self-serving interest." Connolly, 910 S.W.2d at 562.
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of the insurpellate court must focus its attention on the reasonableness
87
ers conduct in denying or delaying payment of the claim.
Although the decision appears to adopt a standard close to the one
articulated in Polasek, the Lyons approach is not as extreme. 88 Whereas
the court in Polasek focused on the mere existence of evidence negating
coverage, 89 the Lyons court recognized that evidence of coverage "might
in some circumstances support a finding that an insurer lacked any reasonable basis for denying a claim ...when the insurer unreasonably disregards the evidence of coverage." 90 This is significant in that the court
affirmatively recognized that the mere existence of evidence calling coverage into question will not automatically defeat bad faith liability. 9 1 Despite this, some courts apparently still rely on the stricter test set forth in
Polasek.92 Furthermore, the Texas Supreme Court's current tendency to
closely scrutinize first-party bad faith claims suggests that it would affirm
a lower court's reliance on the stricter Polasek standard.
The Lyons majority labeled their approach to appellate review a "particularized application" of the traditional no evidence rule. 93 In a strong
dissent, three justices accused the majority of "unprecedented disregard
of [the Texas] [C]onstitution and over a century of jurisprudence. '94 Specifically, the dissent argued that the majority's "particularized" approach
to no evidence review is nothing more than a "device by which this Court
can circumvent the Constitution to consider the credibility and weight of
the evidence, something known until now only by its true name-a factual sufficiency review."'95 According to the dissent, as long as more than
supports a jury's verdict, the claim is suffia mere scintilla of evidence
96
cient as a matter of law.
Under the majority's approach, however, an appellate court is permitted to weigh the evidence in order to determine whether the insurer's
conduct was reasonable. Determining reasonableness, as the dissenters
point out, has always been an issue for a jury to decide. 97 Despite these
87. Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 601.
88. Maxwell & Labadie, supra note 84, at 1358.
89. Polasek, 847 S.W.2d at 284.
90. Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 601 (emphasis added).
91. In other words, the Lyons court recognized that "reasonableness goes to the substance of the evidence supporting the insurer's basis, not to the transaction when viewed as
a whole." Columbia Universal, 923 S.W.2d at 809.
92. Maxwell & Labadie, supra note 84, at 1359 (citing Rogers v. CIGNA Ins. Co., 881
S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1994, no writ), as an example of an appellate
court relying on the Polasek approach).
93. Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 600.
94. Id. at 603 (Doggett, J.,dissenting). The dissenting justices commented on the
Texas Supreme Court's apparent pro-insurer posture: "When an unequivocal constitutional command and concern for the insurance industry collide in this Court, the outcome
is no longer in doubt." Id. at 602.
95. Id.
96. Id. Not surprisingly, the dissenters cited the Simmons case with approval. Id. at
603 n.2.
97. Id. at 603.
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constitutional attacks, the Lyons approach has taken a firm hold. 98 Furthermore, although there is a motion for rehearing pending on the denial
of writ in Simmons, there is nothing to suggest that the court will give
further credence to the constitutional challenges.
It seems clear that a synthesis of Lyons, Dominguez, and Moriel stands
for the proposition that Texas has firmly adopted a bona fide dispute
standard whereby a court must undertake a two-part analysis. First, the
court must determine the basis or potential basis relied upon by the insurer in denying the claim. 99 Second, the court must conduct a "qualitative evaluation of that basis to determine whether an insurer could
reasonably rely on it."100 Although it is uncontroverted that the existence of a bona fide dispute will result in a finding of no liability on the
part of the insurer, the courts have not elaborated on what type or
amount of evidence is sufficient to constitute a bona fide dispute. 10 1 Nevertheless, even without clearly-defined parameters, application of the
bona fide dispute standard in conjunction with the Aranda test will result,
more often than not, in a judgment of no bad faith liability.
IV. BAD FAITH IN THE ABSENCE OF COVERAGE
In the past few years, the Texas Supreme Court has had the opportunity to address the issue of whether an insurer can breach its duty of good
faith and fair dealing toward its insured when the insured's claims are not
covered under the insurance policy. Resolution of this issue turns on
whether one believes the duty of good faith and fair dealing extends to
cover all interactions between an insurer and its insured, or alternatively,
whether the duty stems only from those interactions involving covered
claims.
A.

THE

VILES CASE

The issue of bad faith in the absence of coverage was first addressed by
the Texas Supreme Court in Viles v. Security National Insurance Co.10 2
William and Mary Viles filed a claim under their homeowner's insurance
policies for moisture damage to their home. The damage had been discovered during a routine inspection of the home in connection with a
planned sale of the house. The Viles family promptly notified their insurance agent of the damage, but failed to submit a sworn proof of loss state98. The Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed the Lyons approach in National Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Dominguez, 873 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. 1994). In Dominguez, Justices Doggett
and Gammage renewed their dissent, noting that "[t]he majority's similar contemporaneous writing in Lyons ...offers no more support for today's opinion than the converse." Id.
at 377 n.1. Justice Hightower, however, abandoned his dissent in Lyons and joined the
majority.
99. Columbia Universal, 923 S.W.2d at 810.
100. Id.
101. For example, the court in Columbia Universal noted that the Lyons opinion
"[t]hough seemingly logical on its face ... does little to clarify what evidence is relevant to
the question of reasonableness." Id. at 809.
102. 788 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1990).
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ment within the applicable time limit stated in the insurance contract.
Nevertheless, an agent of the insurance company had already inspected
the home and determined that moisture damage was attributable to a
shower leak that predated coverage. The insurer denied the claim before
the applicable time limit for filing the sworn proof of loss expired. The
result of the denial was that the house sold for nearly half of the original
contract price.
The Viles family filed a claim against the insurer for breach of contract
and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. After a jury trial,
the judge entered judgment for William and Mary Viles, including an
award for punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed and held that
a failure to comply with a contract condition was controlling as to the
question of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Texas
Supreme Court granted writ to determine whether an insurer can breach
the duty of good faith and fair dealing when, ultimately, no coverage is
due under the policy because of a procedural default.
The majority, quoting Arnold, noted that the duty of good faith and
fair dealing "emanates not from the terms of the insurance contract, but
from an obligation imposed in law 'as a result of a special relationship
between the parties governed or created by a contract.' 10 3 The court
concluded that while a failure to comply with a contract condition may be
of evidentiary value in that it may constitute a reasonable basis for denial
of a claim, "a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing will give
rise to a cause of action in tort that is separate from any cause of action
for breach of the underlying insurance contract."'' 4
Essentially, the Viles court affirmatively recognized that the viability of
a bad faith claim does not depend upon coverage in the underlying policy.
As for the.evidentiary value of the procedural default of coverage, the
court held that because the insurer had denied its insureds' claim prior to
the expiration of the applicable time limits, they could not rely on it as a
10 5
basis for denial.
Evidently, the timing of the denial was important to the majority in
Viles. Specifically, the majority stated that "[w]hether there is a reasonable basis for denial ...must be judged by the facts before the insurer at
the time the claim was denied. ' 10 6 Although not explicitly stated in the
Viles opinion, one can infer that the holding may have been different had
the insurer waited to deny the claim until after the applicable time limit
had expired.
The concurring opinion expressed concern that the holding would be
misconstrued as adopting a broad policy of permitting bad faith actions in
the absence of coverage. Indeed, the broad language used in the majority
opinion certainly adds credence to that concern. The concurring justices,
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 567 (quoting Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167).
Id.
Id. at 568.
Id.at 567 (emphasis added).
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however, joined the majority because they agreed that the insurer had
waived the proof of loss defense. Therefore, and for only that reason, a
cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing could
exist. 10 7 The concurrence accused the majority, however, of contriving
the facts to comport with its own agenda:
It is... unnecessary, unwise and improper for the Court to hold, as it
does, "that a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing will
give rise to a cause of action in tort that is separate from any cause of
action for breach of the underlying insurance contract." 10 8
Arguably, the concurring justices believed that the viability of a bad faith
cause of action depends on the existence of coverage at the time of the
bad faith conduct.
B.

POST- VILES INTERPRETATION

Apparently, the concern of the concurring justices in Viles that the decision would be misinterpreted was well founded. The Fifth Circuit, in
First Texas Savings Ass'n v. Reliance Insurance Co.,109 was faced with the
issue of whether Texas law permits bad faith liability in the absence of
coverage. The case involved a savings association which brought suit
against its insurer for refusing to cover losses suffered in a check-kiting
scheme. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff's loss fit
within the loan exclusion clause of the insurance contract. Having ncgated coverage, the court was then faced with the issue of whether the
plaintiff could still recover damages based on the district court's findings
that the insurer breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Fifth
Circuit interpreted Viles as allowing an insured to recover damages in the
absence of policy coverage "[b]ecause the obligations made enforceable
by ...the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing are imposed
independent of the duties under the policy itself. . .. "110
TWo years later in Meridian Oil Production,Inc., v. HartfordAccident
& Indemnity Co.,"' the Fifth Circuit again faced the issue of whether a
plaintiff can bring a bad faith cause of action against an insurer where
there is no coverage under the policy. This time, however, the court refused to rely on its previous interpretation of Viles. 112 Instead, the court
declined to address the issue because the Texas Supreme Court had recently granted a writ of error to hear Stoker, which, according to the Fifth
Circuit, "squarely addresses the question of whether an extra-contractual
113
bad faith claim can exist when coverage is lacking."
Even prior to granting writ in Stoker, however, the Texas Supreme
Court hinted that the Viles holding was narrowly limited to its facts. Spe107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id. at 568-69 (Hecht, J., concurring).
Id. at 568.
950 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1179.
27 F.3d 150 (5th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 152.
Id. at 153 n.4.
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cifically, one can infer from the court's denial of a writ of error in Koral
Industries v. Security-Connecticut Life Insurance Co. 114 that the broad
post-Viles interpretations of bad faith liability in the absence of coverage
were incorrect. In Koral, the plaintiff claimed that Security-Connecticut
Life Insurance had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
handling of a life insurance policy. The defendant insurer raised a fraudulent misrepresentation defense to coverage. 1 5 The jury found that
plaintiff had indeed made false representations. Despite this jury finding,
the trial court rendered judgment for plaintiff. The court of appeals, however, reversed the judgment and held that a defense of fraudulent misrepresentation negated any breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
C.

THE STOKER DECISION

The Stoker case arose out of a multi-car accident in which the Stokers'
automobile hit another vehicle as it was trying to avoid a piece of furniture that had fallen onto the highway from an unidentified pickup truck.
The Stokers filed a claim with their uninsured motorist carrier, but it was
denied due to the insurer's conclusion that Mrs. Stoker was more than
fifty percent at fault. Following this denial, the Stokers filed suit alleging
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and various statutory
violations. Specifically, the suit alleged that the insurer gave an invalid
and unreasonable reason for denying their claim. 116 Republic, the uninsured motorist carrier, responded with a motion for summary judgment
that asserted, for the first time, that the reason for denial was predicated
on the fact that there was no physical contact between the unidentified
vehicle and the Stoker vehicle. Physical contact was a requirement for
coverage under the Stokers' policy. In response to this, the trial court
granted summary judgment on the contract issue, but allowed the Stokers
to continue their bad faith action against the carrier. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the Stokers. 1" 7 Republic appealed the decision on the
grounds that there can be no bad faith liability in the absence of
coverage.
The El Paso Court of Appeals held that Viles was directly on point and
that Republic's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation was actionable bad faith conduct regardless of coverage:
Where that investigation does not include inquiries generally considered essential, or where it applies erroneous standards of fault and
liability, the insurer's denial of a claim can be an independent breach
114. 802 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1990).
115. The insurer alleged that the plaintiff fraudulently misrepresented his health in order to obtain insurance. Koral, 802 S.W.2d at 650-51.
116. It was undisputed that at the time of the denial, the adjuster had not reviewed the
police records or talked with any of the witnesses to the accident. Republic Ins. Co. v.
Stoker, 867 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993), rev'd, 903 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. 1995).
117. The jury found that Republic had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing,
had engaged in unfair or deceptive acts, had not attempted to effectuate an equitable settlement, and had generally behaved unconscionably. Id. Furthermore, the jury found that
Republic did all of the above acts knowingly. Id.
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of good faith and fair dealing, even where another reason for deny-

118
ing the claim is later discovered to justify the denial.
The appellate court justified this conclusion on several grounds. First,
the court reasoned that Republic's actions of quickly denying the claim

without conducting an adequate investigation was exactly the sort of
claim denial that extracontractual causes of action are designed to discourage. 119 Second, the court noted that an insured should be able to
they
rely on the insurer's stated grounds for denial of their claim so that
12 0
can make reasoned decisions about pursuing a claim in court.
The lone dissent filed by Justice Koehler mimicked the concern of the
concurring justices in Viles. Justice Koehler noted that "under Viles and
the majority reasoning herein, you will hope that when suffering a noncovered loss, the company claims representative, when denying your
claim, is rude and gives you some cockamamie or wrong reason for not
honoring your claim. 1112 Additionally, Justice Koehler stated that the
very fact that the Stokers' claim was not covered under the applicable
policy gives the insurance company a reasonable basis to deny the
122
claim.
The Texas Supreme Court granted writ presumably to decide, once and
for all, whether a bad faith cause of action exists in the absence of coverage. Upon review, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower court
and held that "[a]s a general rule there can be no claim for bad faith when
an insurer has promptly denied a claim that is in fact not covered. ' 123 In
reaching this holding, the court did not overrule Viles, but rather distinguished it on the basis that the Stokers' accident, unlike the claim made
by the Vileses, was never covered by their insurance policy.' 24 The Stoker
court, like the Viles court, held that the time of denial is the crucial focal
point. 125 Accordingly, the court concluded that although the insurer used
an erroneous excuse to deny the claim, a reasonable insurer would have
12 6
denied the claim based on the valid exclusion.
To bolster their holding that there can be no bad faith in the absence of
coverage, the court pointed to the Aranda test for stating a claim of bad
faith. Recall that the first part of the Aranda test deals with the reasona118. Id. at 79.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 80. The dissent filed by Justice Koehler dismissed the reliance justification in
the majority's opinion by reminding the court that the insured's attorney also has an affirmative duty to read the policy and investigate the facts to determine the validity of the
claim. Id. at 81 (Koehler, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 80 (Koehler, J., dissenting).

122. Id. at 81.
123. Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. 1995). See also Liberty Nat'l

Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1996) ("But, in most circumstances, an
insured may not prevail on a bad faith claim without first showing that the insurer
breached the contract.").
124. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 340.

125. Id.
126. Id.
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bleness of denying or delaying payments due under a policy. 12 7 The
Stoker court interpreted this part as shielding the insurer from liability for
erroneously denying a claim so long as a reasonable basis exists at the
time of the denial. 128 Because the court concluded that a reasonable insurer would have denied the Stokers' claim for the right reason, the court
129
held that the Stokers failed to satisfy the Aranda test.
As in Viles, there was a concurrence which expressed concern over the
majority's broad language. The justices concurred on the basis that the
Stokers had not suffered any damages as a result of the insurer's conduct, 130 but they strongly disagreed with the majority's proposition that

bad faith liability is tied to the existence of coverage.' 3 ' The concurring
justices feared that the Stoker decision will encourage insurers to deny
claims for erroneous reasons in the hopes that a valid reason will later
132
surface.
The major thrust of the concurrence is that the Stoker majority ignores
the fact that bad faith is an independent tort and instead focuses entirely
on the contractual issue of coverage:
The majority today alters [the] basic principle [that a bad faith claim
is not a claim for breach of contract] by making the Stokers' bad
faith recovery dependent on their claim for breach of contract. In
thus recasting the bad faith claim, the majority adopts a view that
completely disregards 133
the relationship between an insurance company and its insureds.
127. Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 213.
128. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 340; see also Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 600.
129. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 341. ("The Stokers' claim fails because, as a matter of law,
they cannot meet the first prong of the Aranda test."). In addition to Aranda, the court
cited various other authorities to support their conclusion that there can be no bad faith
liability in the absence of coverage. Id. (citing Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Ky.
1993)) (noting that in order to establish a tort action for bad faith the insured must first
prove that the insurer was obligated to pay under the policy); Bartlett v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 997, 1000 (R.I. 1988) ("there can be no cause of action for an
insurer's bad faith refusal to pay a claim until the insured first establishes that the insurer
breached its duty under the contract of insurance"); OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, INSURANCE
COVERAGE DispuES § 12.01, at 503 (7th ed. 1994) ("The determination of whether an
insurer acted in bad faith generally requires as a predicate a determination that coverage
exists for the loss in question."); 15A GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 58:1, at 249 (Ronald A. Anderson & Mark S. Rhodes eds., rev. 2d ed. 1983)
("As a general rule, there may be no extra-contractual recovery where the insured is not
entitled to benefits under the contract of insurance which establishes the duties sought to
be sued upon.").
130. William T. Barker, an insurance litigation specialist who believes that bad faith
liability should not exist absent coverage states that "bad faith conduct, standing alone,
does not give rise to bad faith liability: at a minimum, liability requires some form of
damage to the insured resulting from the conduct." William T. Barker, Bad Faith Liability
Without Coverage: A Reply to Rossi (Oct. 26, 1995) (emphasis in original) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the SMU Law Review).
131. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 342 (Spector, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 345 (Spector, J., concurring). Furthermore, the justices felt that "[fline print
in an insurance policy should not excuse an insurer from liability for damages caused by its
slipshod handling of a claim." Id. at 342.
133. Id. at 343.
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The concurrence further added, "Because the duty of good faith and fair
dealing arises from the [special] relationship between the parties, rather
than the terms of the contract, a breach of the duty does not depend on a
breach of the contract's terms."'1 34 Interestingly, the majority in Stoker
agreed with the principle that a bad faith claim is independent of a policy
claim; however, they noted that permitting liability in the absence of coverage does not necessarily follow. 1 35 In other words, on the one hand the
Stoker majority recognized that bad faith issues and contract issues are
independent, but on the other hand, they held that a bad faith claim is
dependent on contract coverage.

D.

RECONCILING VILES AND STOKER

Both the Viles court and the Stoker court agree that the focal point of
bad faith analysis is at the time of denial. 3 6 Where the two holdings
appear to split ideologically centers on whether the "reasonableness" of
the denial should be judged on a subjective or objective basis. Under a
broad reading of Viles, an insurer who denies a claim based on erroneous
reasons still may be subject to liability even if a valid reason for denial
exists. Under Stoker, however, the mere existence of a valid reason for
denial purportedly shields the insurer from liability despite the fact that
the insurer is unaware of the valid reason.
Despite this difference, the Stoker decision did not overrule Viles, but
rather limited it to its facts. Accordingly, Viles remains good law in that
an insurer is still subject to bad faith liability if the bad faith conduct
occurred prior to a procedural default of coverage.
E.

SHOULD TEXAS ALLOW BAD FAITH IN THE ABSENCE
OF COVERAGE?

Having recognized that a "special relationship" exists between an insurer and its insured, 37 should the duties flowing from this special relationship apply only when the insured files a covered claim? It is certainly
not surprising that the answer to this question differs depending on
whether one looks through the eyes of the insurer or through the eyes of
the insured.
The insurer's perspective is that the duty of good faith and fair dealing
is designed to protect the insured's interest in receiving the benefits bargained for in the insurance contract. 138 The rationale behind denying bad
faith liability in the absence of policy coverage is that there can be no
economic harm for the mishandling of a claim if the proper handling of
134. Id.
135. Id. at 340-41. This principle was recognized both in Viles and in Moriel. "[C]Iaims
for insurance contract coverage are distinct from those in tort for bad faith; resolution of
one does not determine the other." Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 18 n.8 (emphasis added).
136. Viles, 788 S.W.2d at 567; Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 340.
137. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167.
138. Paul E.B. Glad et al., Bad Faith Liability in the Absence of Coverage?, 7 BAD
FAITH L. REP. 1 (1991).
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the claim would have resulted in the same outcome. 139 This view does
not discount the existence of a special relationship, but rather asserts that
the absence of economic harm negates the need for a cause of action.
Insureds, on the other hand, view the duty of good faith and fair dealing in a broader sense. They believe that an insurer must act fairly and in
good faith regardless of the merits of the underlying insurance claim.
One proponent of bad faith in the absence of coverage has stated that
"[t]he insurance industry must appreciate the special role it plays in
American society, and its quasi-public nature, and understand that its
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even in the absence
of coverage, can have serious consequences upon a person .... 140
While it is uncontroverted that insurers hold a special role in American
society, whether or not their mishandling of a noncovered claim should
result in tort liability is legitimately debatable. One proposed reason for
permitting liability in the absence of coverage is detrimental reliance. In
Stoker, the plaintiff argued that she should have been entitled to rely on
Republic's original and incorrect reason for denying the claim in deciding
whether to file suit. 1 41 The Texas Supreme Court, however, rejected this
argument by stating that "[t]he Stokers cannot preclude Republic from
relying on a reason for denying their claim
that existed at the time, even if
1 42
it was not the reason Republic gave."'
Although this result, on its face, is arguably unfair, one must remember
that the insured and his or her attorney also have a duty to read the policy language and investigate the merits of a claim prior to initiating a
lawsuit. 143 It follows, therefore, that if the insureds knew or should have
known that the claim was not covered under the policy, they should be
denied recovery.
While permitting liability in the absence of coverage has been highly
criticized, one narrow exception to the general rule has been recognized.
This exception is best illustrated by the Arizona Supreme Court case of
Rawlings v. Apodaca. 44 In Rawlings, a fire damaged property on a farm
owned by David and Elizabeth Rawlings. The Rawlings family suspected
that the fire was caused by the negligence of their neighbors-the Apodacas. The Rawlings family had a $10,000 homeowner's policy covering the
139. Id. at 3. In support of this proposition, the authors state that "a determination of
no coverage means that the insurer did not commit bad faith." Id.
140. Michael A. Rossi, Bad Faith in the Absence of Coverage: An Insured Who Sustains Any Harm as a Result of an Insurance Carrier'sBreach of the Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing Should Be Entitled to Bad Faith Damages Even When the Insurance Policy

at Issue Does Not Provide Any Coverage, in

INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION COMMIT-

5-29 (Feb. 1995).
141. Recall that the majority opinion in the appellate court felt than an insured should
be able to rely on the insurer's stated grounds for denying a claim. Stoker, 867 S.W.2d at
80. The court noted that "to hold otherwise vitiates the tort by allowing the insurer to
escape liability under any theory that allows it to avoid payment .... no matter how weak
the earlier theory that is abandoned." Id. (citing Viles, 788 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1990)).
TEE

142. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 341.

143. Stoker, 867 S.W.2d at 81 (Koehler, J., dissenting).
144. 726 P.2d 565 (Ariz. 1986).
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barn with Farmers Insurance Co. Shortly after the fire, the Rawlingses
filed a claim with Farmers, which hired an investigation firm to determine
the exact cause of the fire. The Rawlings family notified Farmers that
their loss exceeded the $10,000 coverage and that they would be pursuing
a personal claim against the Apodacas for the uninsured portion of the
loss. The Rawlings family specifically asked Farmers if they needed to
hire their own investigators. Farmers responded by telling the Rawlings
family that they would be provided with copies of all the investigation
reports prepared by Farmers' investigators.
Ultimately, the investigation revealed that the Apodacas were in fact at
fault in the fire. However, during the pendency of the investigation,
Farmers discovered that the Apodocas were also insured by Farmers and
that their policy had $100,000 liability limits. Fearing that the Rawlings
family would make a claim covered under the Apodocas' policy, Farmers
refused to turn over the investigation reports to the Rawlings family as
promised. In response to this refusal, the Rawlings family sued Farmers
for bad faith, arguing that Farmers' conduct made the Rawlings family's
situation worse with respect to their uncovered claim against the
Apodacas.
The trial court awarded the Rawlings family $1000 in compensatory
damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. The court of appeals, however, reversed the bad faith claim on the grounds that a first-party bad
faith action could not be maintained when there is no allegation that the
insurer denied or delayed payment of the Rawlings family's insurance
claim. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review to address the issue
of whether an insurer commits bad faith by impeding its insured's recovery of the uninsured portion of the loss.
The Arizona Supreme Court recognized that an insured is not entitled
to either payment of claims that are not covered or to receive any services
or protections beyond the scope of the insurance contract; however, the
court affirmatively recognized that the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing "entitle[s] the insured to insist that.., the insurer not provide the
promised protection with one hand while destroying the very objects of
the relationship with the other. '145 The Arizona Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the bad faith judgment.
In recognizing bad faith liability in the absence of coverage, the court
stated that "the insurance contract and the relationship it creates contain
more than the company's bare promise to pay certain claims when forced
to do so; implicit in the contract and the
relationship is the insurer's obli1 46
gation to play fairly with its insured."
The question after Rawlings was how broadly to apply the exception.
Specifically, did the Rawlings exception open the door to any bad faith
claim in the absence of coverage, or is the exception limited to cases
145. Id. at 571.
146. Id. at 570.
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where the insurer's conduct causes some injury that is separate and independent from the nonpayment of the claim?
The Arizona Supreme Court answered this question in Deese v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 14 7 by stating:
We reaffirm our holding in Rawlings ... that a plaintiff may simultaneously bring an action both for breach of contract and for bad faith,
and need not prevail on the contract claim in order to prevail on the
bad faith claim, provided plaintiff proves
a breach of the implied cov148
enant of good faith and fair dealing.
The plaintiffs in Stoker relied on Deese to urge the Texas Supreme
Court to recognize bad faith liability in the absence of coverage. The
Texas Supreme Court, however, distinguished Deese by noting that it did
not involve an insurer denying a claim not covered by the policy, as in
Stoker, but rather involved a covered claim with an argument over the
reasonableness of medical bills. 149 Although the Texas Supreme Court
rejected the application of Deese, it implicitly recognized a narrower version of the Rawlings exception: "We do not exclude ... the possibility
that in denying the claim, the insurer may commit some act, so extreme,
that would cause injury independent of the policy claim.' 150 In other
words, the Stoker court seemingly recognized that if an insurer's actions
rise to the level of an independent tort, such as intentional infliction of
emotional distress, slander, defamation, or the like, the viability of the
independent claim would not depend on the existence of coverage. 15 '
At least one court has held that the dicta in Stoker is not limited to
Rawlings-type cases. In SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Century Indemnity
Co.,152 the court held that "Stoker does not deprive SnyderGeneral of its
right to pursue an Insurance Code violation" and that "Stoker also appears to preserve a failure to investigate claim in at least some situations
1 53
where the insurer ultimately denies coverage on a proper ground."'
The court relied on those rationales to hold that Century was not entitled
to summary judgment on the bad faith claim even though there was no
policy coverage. 154 The significance of this decision, however, is limited
by the fact that it was decided in a federal district court rather than a
Texas state court. Furthermore, there has been no reported state court
opinion in which a court has allowed an insured to maintain a claim for
an insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing despite a
147. 838 P.2d 1265 (Ariz. 1992).
148. Id. at 1270.
149. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d at 341 n.1.
150. Id.; see also Howard v. INA County Mut. Ins. Co., 933 S.W.2d 212, 217 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1996, no writ).
151. Because the plaintiff's claim would be for some independent injury not related to
the insurance contract, the Rawlings-type case is not a true exception to the rule against
bad faith liability in the absence of coverage. Rather, it provides a plaintiff with an avenue
to side-step the proscription of bad faith liability in the absence of coverage.
152. 907 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
153. Id. at 1006.
154. Id.
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finding that there was no viable coverage claim. 155
Ultimately, absent actions that rise to the level of an independent tort,
rejecting bad faith recovery in the absence of coverage rests on sound
principles. First, as stated earlier, a valid coverage defense is a per se
reasonable basis to deny a claim. Second, an insured who is not entitled
to coverage is not economically harmed by an insurer's reliance on an
erroneous reason to deny the claim. Third, although permitting bad faith
liability in the absence of coverage might serve to deter certain conduct
on the part of the insurer, the policyholders will be forced to pay higher
premiums to compensate for the increased litigation that is certain to accompany such a rule.
V. REMEDIES FOR BAD FAITH
The issues discussed above primarily address the legalities and parameters of the bad faith cause of action. Determining the proper basis for
providing a remedy to a bad faith plaintiff, on the other hand, is more of
an academic debate. As such, the debate among scholars has centered
primarily on whether tort damages or contract damages should be used to
compensate successful plaintiffs.
A.

TORT DAMA GES VS. CONTRA CT DAMA GES

Prior to the recognition of an independent tort for breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing, an aggrieved insured was limited to a cause
of action for breach of contract. 156 Accordingly, the insured could recover only up to the amount owed under the policy plus any provable
consequential damages. 157 Consequential damages are damages that naturally arise from the breach and are foreseeable at the time of contracting. 158 In other words, in addition to being foreseeable, an insured
had the burden of causally linking the damages to a breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing.
Some proponents of contract damages argue that a conflict in a firstparty setting is nothing more than a disagreement about the terms of an
insurance contract, and, therefore, tort analysis is unnecessary. 159 Other
proponents of contract damages argue that "[c]ontract remedies are not
inherently incapable of redressing the kinds of losses and injuries frequently suffered by insureds when insurers fail to perform their obligations."'1 60 Notwithstanding the proposition that contractual remedies are
155. See, e.g., Tivoli Corp. v. Jewelers Mut. Ins. Co., 932 S.W.2d 704, 712 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1996, writ requested); North Am. Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Southern Marine &
Aviation Underwriting, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no
writ).
156. Ailts, supra note 17, at 1320.
157. See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 151 (Kan. 1980).
158. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
159. William Powers, Jr., Border Wars, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 1230 (1994).
160. Robert H. Jerry, II, Remedying Insurers' Bad Faith Performance: A Reassessment,
18 CoNN. L. REV. 271, 299 (1986).
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sufficient to deter bad faith conduct on the part of insurers, one problem
with limiting bad faith recovery to contractual remedies is that contract
theory promotes efficient breach. Under the efficient breach doctrine, if
it is economically advantageous for one party to breach the contract, the
law should not deter the breach. 161 The efficient breach doctrine, therefore, would allow, if not encourage, an insurer to deny the claim and then
play a wait-and-see game with the insured. 162 Furthermore, during this
wait-and-see period, the insured would often be left financially unable to
remedy his or her loss while the insurer, on the other hand, would be able
to retain the insurance premiums and invest them as it sees fit. 1 63 Additionally, the first-party insurance framework involves certain human factors that are missing in ordinary business transactions. For example,
while the efficient breach doctrine may be properly applied in a commercial setting, its application to an insured who has just suffered a personal
loss is troubling. 164 Opponents of restricting bad faith recovery to contractual remedies argue that contract law, by its very nature, is simply not
designed to effectively regulate the actions of insurers. 165 These opponents argue that tort damages are inherently more broad than contract
damages and, therefore, provide a better source for both compensating
the victim and deterring the wrongdoer.1 66 Specifically, the availability of
recovery for mental anguish and emotional distress coupled with the possibility of punitive damages overrides the theoretical application of the
161. See E. ALLAN

FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrS 847 (2d ed. 1990).
162. This discussion highlights a theoretical problem with applying contract theory to
the tort of first-party bad faith. This application should not be misconstrued, however, as
standing for the proposition that insurance companies purposefully deny valid claims because they know that there is a substantial chance that the insured, whether it be from
unsophistication or financial strain, will not pursue litigation against them.
163. Admittedly, the insurer will have to pay a victorious insured prejudgment interest,
however, if commercial interest rates exceed legal rates during the wait-and-see period, the
insurer will profit from its breach. See Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon:
ContractRises from the Ashes of the Bad Faith Tort, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 483, 531 (1994)
(noting that if the only damages available to the insured are the amount due under the
policy plus interest, the insurer "has every interest in retaining the money, earning the
higher rates of interest on the outside market, and hoping eventually to force the insured
into a settlement for less than the policy amount").
164. See Gregory S. Crespi, Good Faith and Bad Faith in Contract Law: Reflections on
a Cautionary Tale and Border Wars, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1283 (1994) (noting that many
contract law scholars criticize the efficient breach doctrine "because often there are substantial hidden social costs of contract breach that make so-called 'efficient breaches'
highly inefficient"); see also Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LECAL
STUD. 1 (1989).
165. Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 575 ("[C]ontract damages not only fail to provide adequate
compensation [in bad faith cases] but also fail to provide a substantial deterrence against
breach by the party who derives a commercial benefit from the relationship."); see also
Robert H. Jerry, II, The Wrong Side of the Mountain: A Comment on Bad Faith's Unnatural History, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1338 n.ll0 (1994). Although Professor Jerry is a proponent of contractual remedies, he notes that the common theme for supporting tort recovery
"is that insurance policies are different from ordinary commercial contracts, and contractual remedies are inadequate in this setting to balance the interests of insurer and insured
fairly." Jerry, supra, at 1338.
166. Michael H. Cohen, Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1291, 1310-11 (1985).
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efficient breach doctrine by providing insurers with incentive not to
breach. 167 The Texas Supreme Court, for example, recognized that
"without such a [tort] cause of action insurers can arbitrarily deny coverage and delay payment of a claim with no more penalty than interest on
the amount owed. ' 168 Inherent in this statement was the court's recognition of the narrow scope of contract damages.
In contrast, opponents of extracontractual tort remedies, such as Mark
Gergen, 169 counter the purported deterrent effect by arguing that al170
lowing tort damages results in increased costs and limited benefits.
Gergen argues that the tort of bad faith "has troubling distributional consequences: It enriches a few at the expense of many with significant
transaction costs. ' 17 1 Essentially, Gergen's argument is that the costs associated with increased litigation and high jury verdicts are passed on by
172
the insurers to insureds through increased premiums.
While the debate over tort law or contract law is likely to continue
among scholars, the resolution of the issue is of little significance to the
modern-day plaintiff. Specifically, as the Texas Supreme Court has taken
steps to reign in the common-law tort of first-party bad faith, more and
more plaintiffs are turning to the Texas Insurance Code for a statutory
basis of relief.
B.

A

SHIFr TOWARDS STATUTORY LAW

The availability of statutory remedies for breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing was affirmatively recognized by the Texas Supreme
Court in Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.173 The case
involved a bad faith failure to pay policy proceeds under a homeowner's
policy after a fire destroyed the Vails' home. The Vails sued their insurer,
Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, for the full amount of
the policy and for damages under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(DTPA) and the Texas Insurance Code. The jury found that Texas Farm
Bureau had intentionally failed to exercise good faith in settling the
claim. Based on these findings, the trial court awarded the Vails three
times the amount of the full policy limit plus attorney's fees and prejudgment interest on the trebled figure.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that no private
cause of action for unfair claims settlement practices existed under the
DTPA or the Insurance Code. 174 The Texas Supreme Court granted writ
167. Papetti, supra note 10, at 1932-33.
168. Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167.
169. Mark Gergen is the Joseph C. Hutcheson Professor at the University of Texas
School of Law.
170. Mark Gergen, A Cautionary Tale About ContractualGood Faith in Texas, 72 TEX.
L. REV. 1235, 1250 (1994).
171. Id. at 1250.
172. Id. at 1250-51 n.101.
173. 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988).
174. The court of appeals affirmed the recovery of policy limits, prejudgment interest,
and attorney's fees. The court, however, reversed the treble damages. Id. at 130.
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in order to squarely address the issue. In a very important decision for
Texas insureds, the Texas Supreme Court held that both the DTPA and
the Insurance Code provide an insured with a remedy for the unfair or
deceptive acts of insurers. 175 This decision was accompanied by a strong
dissent from Justice Gonzalez who stated that "It]he legislature has not
provided for a private cause of action for unfair claim settlement practices under either the DTPA or the Insurance Code. In finding such a
cause of action, the majority has had to resort to a tortured reading of the
DTPA [and] the Insurance Code .... "176
As illustrated by the dissent, the original impact of the Vail decision
was hampered by confusion over its scope and effect. For example, practitioners and judges alike were confused as to the interplay between the
common law and the statutory law. 177 The confusion intensified in 1994
with the Texas Supreme Court decision of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Watson.' 78 In Watson, the court reaffirmed the Vail decision as it applied to
first-party cases, but refused to recognize that a private cause of action
existed for unfair settlement practices under section 17.46(a) of the
DTPA. 179 This refusal, although dicta, was squarely at odds with the Vail
opinion. As a result of this ambiguity, a split in the lower courts inevita180
bly developed.
Fortunately, much of the early confusion surrounding the Insurance
Code was cleared up by the 1995 Amendments to Article 21.21.181
Although all of the ambiguities have not yet been settled, the result of the
amendments is a statute that will provide more predictability and certainty than the common law for both plaintiffs and insurance companies.
Ultimately, the success of Article 21.21 will depend on how the legislation is interpreted by the courts and what position the Texas legislature
decides to take with respect to protecting the interests of both insureds
and insurers. As one commentator noted, the current version of Article
21.21 allows "insurers... to adjust claims on the true merits of the claim
175. Id. at 132 (citing The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act:
Hearings on Tex. H.B. 417 Before the House Comm. on Bus. & Indus., 63d Leg., R.S. 17
(Feb. 27, 1973) (the DTPA was intended to apply to the insurance industry)).
176. Id. at 137 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
177. Mark L. Kincaid, UnfairInsurance Practices-The Law Under Vail, Watson, & the
1995 Amendments, in 5TH ANN. ULTIMATE INS. SEMINAR M-50 (Mar. 1996) ("The statutes
and the duty of good faith and fair dealing are intertwined, providing a set of complementary, overlapping, but not identical causes of action against [insurers] that commit unfair
insurance practices.").
178. 876 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1994). For an excellent discussion on the impact of Watson,
see Christopher W. Martin, Insurance Litigation Since Allstate v. Watson: An Interim
Analysis, 21 CAVEAT VENDOR 1 (1996).
179. Watson, 876 S.W.2d at 149.
180. Compare Hart v. Berko, 881 S.W.2d 502, 509 n.3 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ
denied) (holding that Watson extinguished the private cause of action under § 17.46(a))
with Crum & Forster, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 887 S.W.2d 103, 116 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1994, no writ) (relying on § 17.46(a) to support a private cause of action).
181. The substance of the statutory developments are beyond the scope of this Comment. For a detailed analysis of the statutory developments, see CHRISTOPHER W. MARTIN, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO TEXAS INSURANCE CODE ARTICLE 21.21 (1995).
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without the foreboding shadow of bad faith hanging over their head.
While this statement echoes the defense perspective of bad faith law, its
message of adjusting claims on their true merits serves the interests of
both insureds and insurers.

VI. CONCLUSION
As the common-law tort of first-party bad faith takes its last few
breaths, the emergence of Article 21.21 will preside over Texas bad faith
litigation. Although some may lament the imminent passing of commonlaw bad faith, the net effect for Texans is a system that is better equipped
to balance the interests of both insureds and insurers. This balance, if
maintained by both the courts and the legislature, will ensure the future
existence of insurance companies in Texas and will provide a clearer set
of guidelines and procedures for insurers to follow in adjusting claims.

182. R. Brent Cooper, Insurance Code and Bad Faith-RecentStatutory and Case Law
Developments and How to Take Advantage of Them-Defense Perspective, in STATE BAR
OF TEXAS, 9TH ANN. ADVANCED DPTA/INSURANCE/CONSUMER LAW COURSE N-1 (May
1996).

